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Threat Assessment

Training module for NGOs operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas

Produced for the OFDA/InterAction PVO Security Task Force

By

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This is a draft module. The views expressed are the author's own. Please direct all comments and suggestions to:
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Module Information

Goal

Improve your ability to assess threats to NGO personnel and property, thereby helping you make more-informed decisions about which security strategies and procedures to adopt.

Measurable learning objectives

After completing this module, you will be able to:

- Articulate the link between threat assessment and security measures.
- List three of the five types of information you want to get from a threat assessment.
- List the three causes of threats.
- List the four general approaches to conducting threat assessments.

Key Learning Points

The key learning points in this module are as follows.

- Threats are the possibility that someone will harm NGO personnel, or steal or damage NGO property, through purposeful, often-violent action.
- Threat assessment is the *analysis* of the *likelihood* that NGOs will confront threats.
- The purpose of threat assessment to help you make more-informed decisions about which security measures to adopt. It does so by identifying the most likely threats you will face, allowing you to identify the security measures most likely to keep you safe—and avoid adopting unnecessary ones.
- Threat assessment is not a one-time event, but a process of continuous re-evaluation of threats to ensure that you continue to have appropriate security measures in place. It is important to undertake a threat assessment when you start a program, and update it at regular intervals and when the threats change.
- When you have completed your threat assessment, you want to have five types of information about threats (security incidents) you may face—types, situations in which they may occur, causes, likelihood, and the potential that they may change.
- There are four techniques to threat assessments: interviews, analyzing patterns and trends, gauging the threat level, and looking for indicators that threats may change. Each approach has its own strengths and limitations. It is therefore important to use all four together to conduct a threat assessment.

Threat Assessment

Every NGO in the field conducts assessments of the threats he or she is most likely to confront, and then decides which security measures to adopt. This process is often intuitive and subconscious: If you believe a road has been mined, and therefore take an alternative route, you are assessing threats and adopting security measures.

The purpose of this module is to improve the process you use to assess threats, thereby helping you make more-informed decisions about which security measures to adopt.

- This first section of the module outlines the fundamental concepts and principles surrounding threat assessment, and describes four threat assessment techniques.
- The following section provides several supplementary worksheets and tools.

Concepts and principles

Threats are the possibility that someone will harm NGO personnel, or steal or damage NGO property—through purposeful, often-violent action.

As used in this module, the threat environment is comprised of: (1) threats to personnel, such as harassment; (2) threats to property, such as burglary; and (3) threats directed against property, but which may harm personnel, such as car-jacking. But it does *not* conclude:

- *Vulnerability* to threats, which differs among NGOs based on each one's locations, exposure, security measures, and "image"—the perception of the NGO's staff and programs. (The issue of vulnerability is covered in another module.)
- *Accidents and health risks*, which is usually a discipline problem (failure to adopt appropriate health and safety precautions) for which better threat assessments (and the techniques described in this module) will not help.

Threat assessment is the *analysis of the likelihood of confronting threats*.

The purpose of threat assessment is to help you make more-informed decisions about which security measures to adopt. When deciding on security measures, NGOs face two competing goals:

- *Effectiveness*—adopting appropriate security measures that will protect you from the specific threats you are most likely to face
- *Efficiency*—avoiding adoption of unnecessary security measures that have significant "costs" (financial costs, or diversion of staff time, effort and focus).

Threat assessment helps you identify the most likely threats you will face, which helps you identify security measures most likely to keep you safe—and avoid unnecessary ones.

Threat assessments must be updated to ensure your security measures remain appropriate.

- Conduct an *initial* threat assessment when you start your program, and then adopt the appropriate security measures.

- *Update* your assessment at regular intervals (to help avoid subconsciously becoming habituated to a changes in threats) and whenever the threats change—and then change your security measures as appropriate.

To help you decide which security measures to adopt, focus your threat assessment on the five types of information that will affect the security measures you adopt. The are:

1. *Type of threat*—pilferage, car-jacking, etc. You may take different types of precautions against car-jackings and landmines.
2. *Situation in which the threats are encountered*—in vehicles, at NGO sites, etc. Faced with the threat of robbery, you may take different precautions at your office (e.g., keeping limited cash on hand) than while walking in town (e.g., traveling in groups).
3. *Cause of the threats*—the three main causes due to the threat environment.
 - Crime/banditry—Actions by persons with malicious, financial or personal motivations (such as robbery) not connected with larger political or military efforts
 - Direct threats—Actions taken by a belligerent (usually to aid in a political or military effort) for which NGOs are the intended target (such as robbing a food aid convoy)
 - Indirect threats—Actions taken by a belligerent for which the local population or other belligerents are the intended target, but NGOs are unintentionally affected, such as NGOs hitting a landmine on a road. (This may be called “getting caught in the cross-fire,” though gunfire is not the most likely way to be indirectly threatened.)
4. *Threat level*—defined as the likelihood that your NGO will face threats (high, medium or low). Faced with the possibility of criminal assault, you may adopt no security measures if there is a low threat, but extensive ones (e.g., curfews) if there is a high threat.
5. *Potential changes in threats*. The security measures you adopt for a situation with a landmine threat will no longer be appropriate if there is an new kidnapping threat.

Unfortunately, even the best threat assessments cannot guarantee your security.

- Threat assessments are hard to conduct because they require a complete understanding usually complex situations.
- Luck counts—it is impossible to know what every criminal, bandit, or soldier will do; you may be an “accidental” victim in today’s fluid, unpredictable conflicts; and security measures sometimes fail in the face of a trained, lucky, determined attacker.
- Even if you do conduct an excellent assessment, you may decide *not* to adopt appropriate security measures if the costs are too high (such as withdrawing from an area with populations in great need).

But a thorough threat assessment can help you make more-informed decisions on which security measures to adopt, and therefore improve your chances considerably.

Four threat assessment techniques

There are four general techniques for conducting a threat assessment: Interviews, pattern and trend analysis, threat levels, and indicators of changes in the threat environment.

Because each has its own strengths and limitations, try to use all of them by thinking of them as four “steps” to developing a complete “picture” of threats.

1. Start with interviews to provide basic information

Careful, structured interviews provide you with broad information on the threats others have faced, and provide a frame of reference for focusing other assessment techniques.

- Interviews are a good starting if your NGO is new to an area because they can take little time, and usually provide basic information on threats which, in turn, allows you to focus your use of complementary (and more time-consuming) techniques.
- But by themselves, interviews rarely yield sufficiently reliable and specific information on past incidents, and therefore provide little more than the combined, filtered, conventional wisdom of those you interview.

To conduct such interviews:

- Focus on key questions that can be answered by those you interview—location, types, situation, and likely cause of threats.
- NGOs are often good sources because you are more likely to face similar threats as they (compared to others, like peacekeeping forces). When speaking to non-NGOs, consider carefully the extent to which their experiences are relevant to your situation. For example, you may face the similar criminal threats as an expatriate businessman.

The Interview worksheet in the next section can assist you in keeping interviews focused and compiling information from several interviews.

2. Identify specific patterns and trends

Examination of quantitative information on past security incidents helps you identify the most common features of security incidents (patterns) and changes in them (trends).

Pattern/trend analysis may yield sufficiently *reliable and specific information* on threats (such as what roads are mined) on which to base security measures.

To identify patterns and trends:

- Compile data on past incidents—date/time, location, type, situation, and likely cause. As with interviews, NGOs are often a good source of data. For criminal threats, data from other expatriate organizations (especially UN ones) may also be helpful.
- Display the data in a manner that makes it easy to analyze, such as in a simple list.
- If it is difficult to identify patterns or trends with a list, use an uncluttered map and color-coded pins, stickers, or markers (over plastic acetate). To identify patterns, mark all of one incident type first, look for patterns, then add another type. To identify trends, mark incidents in order of occurrence (identifying how the map changes over time) or divide time frame in half, and do two maps.
- To analyze the information, try to identify clusters of incidents (highest likelihood) by each factor, such as car-jackings on a specific road.
- If you are concerned about indirect threats (being caught in the crossfire) because the conflict has no clear battle lines, identify patterns and trends related to the conflict that may indicate dangerous areas (e.g., skirmishes, ambushes, and massacres).

The Incident Data Collection Worksheet in the next section can help you collect data and present it clearly for analysis.

3. Gauge the threat level

Analyzing the factors affecting threats helps you to gauge the threat level—the likelihood that NGOs will encounter security incidents (usually described as high, medium or low).

In most instances, you will not be able to draw exclusively on pattern/trend analysis to gauge the threat level.

- Pattern/trend analysis requires a documented history of security incidents that may not be available if no one has compiled it or NGOs are new to an area.
- There may be no clear and consistent patterns/trends.
- Any history of incidents may be irrelevant to a current situation if the threat environment has just changed dramatically, such as if there is a new military offensive.

Unfortunately, the traditional approach to threat levels—using one threat level chart as the only assessment technique—can be problematic.

- Merely describing the threats as high, medium, or low can be dangerous: these terms mean different things to different people and are, by themselves, not useful in identifying appropriate security measures.
- If the levels are tied inextricably to a set of security procedures that must be implemented, the procedures adopted may be inappropriate because they do not consider the types of incidents, situation in which you will encounter them, their cause, and the likelihood you will face them.

To gauge the threat level in a more appropriate manner, it is useful to examine the factors affecting threats. There are many such factors for each of the three major causes of threats. To assess these factors, use the worksheets below to identify the most important factors, and what the situation might look like for those factors at different threat levels. To do so:

- Modify them by adding any other factors appropriate to your situation.
- On each worksheet, circle the description appropriate for each factor, and then add the results to gain a *rough picture* of the threat level. Usually, the results will be mixed—not clearly a high, medium, or low threat.
- Use extra worksheets for regions in which the threat varies.
- See the last section for tips on understanding motivations for targeting NGOs.

After filling out the worksheets, you should not attempt to produce a misleadingly specific quantitative answers. And simply saying that the crime threat is medium to high is not useful because that means different things to different people. Instead, it is best to generate descriptions based on the presence of the underlying factors affecting threats. The following is an example:

The crime threat in town “x” is medium to high. While there is little crime in the daytime near NGO sites, criminals roam freely in areas near NGO residences at night. While police patrols deter some criminals, street crimes are common, and criminals often burglarize NGOs residences, even when occupied. Criminals are sometimes aggressive, operate in small groups, and have been known to occasionally carry handguns. Police respond most of the time, though often slowly.

Crime/Banditry Threat for:			
Threat Level Factors	Low Threat	Medium Threat	High Threat
Crime mobility	Criminals almost always remain in high-crime areas, and do not enter areas near NGO sites	Criminals are rare during the day, but roam freely at night, often entering areas near NGO sites	Criminals or gangs roam freely at night, and target expatriates in areas near NGO sites for burglaries and violent crime
Crime ambiance	NGO sites are surrounded by low-crime buffer zones, which (though unsafe at night due to street crime) keep most criminals away from NGO sites	NGO sites are near high-crime areas which are unsafe due to street crime (day and night)	NGO sites are near high-crime areas, in which criminals and gangs operate freely, and where street and residential crime may be violent
Criminal aggressiveness	Criminals are deterred by police and avoid confrontation, engaging mostly in crimes of stealth (burglaries)	Criminals are somewhat deterred by police, committing street crimes and burglaries, but usually avoid confrontations	Criminals are not deterred by police, and do not avoid (or seek out) violent confrontations during street crime or burglaries
Weapons used	Criminals are usually unarmed, or armed with non-lethal weapons	Criminals are usually armed with knives or other small cutting weapons	Criminals are usually armed with machetes or firearms (handguns, rifles)
Size of criminal groups	Criminals usually operate alone or with one partner, and avoid gratuitous violence and confrontations	Criminals usually operate in groups of two to four, and usually avoid gratuitous violence and confrontations	Criminals usually operate in groups larger than four, are frequently confrontational, use gratuitous violence, and are prone to use deadly force against victims
Police deterrence and response	Police/security forces partially deter crime and usually respond quickly enough to disrupt burglaries	Police/security forces sometimes deter crime, respond slowly to calls, and only occasionally apprehend suspects after a criminal act	Police/security forces are ineffective at deterring crime, rarely respond to calls, and seldom arrest suspects.
Police training and professionalism	Police/security forces are reasonably well-trained and generally professional, but may lack manpower and resources to be fully responsive	Police have some training and limited professionalism, are somewhat apathetic to emergency calls, and are too limited in manpower and resources to significantly deter crime and respond effectively	Police do not exist; are untrained, inept, corrupt, and unresponsive; or collaborate with criminals to allow them to carry out crimes with police protection
Professionalism of military forces	Troops are regularly paid, professional, well-disciplined, and treat others with respect	Troops are rarely paid, somewhat disciplined, treat people with suspicion, and sometimes pillage and steal goods	Troops are young recruits, not paid, ill-disciplined, treat people with disdain, and regularly steal whatever they want
Military leaders' control over subordinate troops	Leaders appear to have good control over their troops, and can be effectively appealed to with problems	Leaders have some control over their troops, and appealing to them with problems sometimes results in action	Leaders appear to have little control over their troops, and have shown no ability to control them when appealed to
General sense of security	There is a general sense of security, though crime occurs	There is a general sense of insecurity, though not lawlessness	There is a general sense of lawlessness and impunity
Total			

Indirect Threat Level for:			
Threat Level Factors	Low Threat	Medium Threat	High Threat
Knowledge of conflict locations	You know the areas controlled by each belligerent	You know the general areas controlled by each belligerent	You cannot identify the areas controlled by each belligerent
Distance from disputed areas	Your operations are distant from areas over which belligerents are fighting	Your operations are near areas over which belligerents are fighting, or you must sometimes cross into such areas	Your operations are within areas over which belligerents are fighting
Fluidity of conflict	Areas under belligerents' control and in dispute rarely change, and when they do, they change slowly, slightly, and with significant warning	Areas under belligerents' control or in dispute sometimes change, and usually with some warning	Areas under belligerents' control and in dispute change often, quickly, significantly, and with no warning
Knowledge of areas with landmines	You know which areas are mined, mined areas are well-marked, and there is a single, reliable resource to gain landmine information	You know most of the mined areas, most mined areas are marked, and there is a usually reliable resource to provide most landmine information	You do not know which areas are mined, mined areas are seldom marked, and there is no single, reliable resource for landmine information
Distance from mined areas	Your NGO operations are distant from any mined areas	You must sometimes go into areas with mines, but you stay on paved/well-traveled roads	Your operations are within mined areas
Continuance of landmine laying	Belligerents have shown that they are incapable and/or unwilling to lay new mines	Belligerents are capable of laying new mines, and have sometimes done so in areas or on roads that are known to often contain mines	Belligerents have demonstrated a capability and willingness to continue to lay mines in unexpected places
Belligerent tactics and weapons	Belligerents <i>seldom</i> use tactics and weapons likely to result in NGOs becoming unintentional victims	Belligerents <i>sometimes</i> use tactics and weapons that <i>may</i> result in NGOs becoming unintentional victims (riots, raids, cordon and search operations, sniper fire)—though there are clear patterns and usually some warning	Belligerents <i>often</i> use tactics and weapons <i>likely</i> to result in NGOs being unintentional victims (landmines, terrorist attacks, artillery shelling, bombing)—with no clear patterns and little warning
Total			

Targeted Threat from		for:	
Threat Level Factors	Low Threat	Medium Threat	High Threat
Capability	Belligerent currently has limited military capabilities near areas in which NGOs operate	Belligerent has some military capabilities near areas in which NGOs operate	Belligerent has significant military capabilities in areas in which NGOs operate
Motivation: Economic	No belligerent needs relief aid as a source of support (food, militarily valuable equipment and supplies, money, equipment and supplies that can be sold)	One or more belligerents rely on relief aid as one source of support, or want to ensure that other belligerents do not benefit from it	One or more belligerents rely heavily on relief aid; losing access to it would severely undermine their chances of success
Motivation: Politico-military	Rebel groups have no politico-military motivations for attacking NGOs (do not need to gain recognition, would not benefit from provoking a government over-reaction, or demonstrate lack of government control in an area)	Rebel groups have some politico-military problems that could be ameliorated by targeting NGOs	Rebel groups are desperate, and need to change the course of a conflict or risk losing
History	Belligerent has never targeted NGOs	Belligerent has sometimes targeted NGOs	Belligerent has often targeted NGOs in the past
Intention	Belligerent is friendly, works to facilitate NGO work, and has never threatened NGOs	Belligerent has expressed unease over NGO work, subtly impedes NGO efforts, and has sometimes made veiled threats against NGOs	Belligerent opposes the work of NGOs (stating they aid their opponent), and has recently made clear and unambiguous threats
Security force capability	Local military or security forces effectively deter belligerent from threatening NGOs, and protect NGOs from any threats	Local military or security forces sometimes deter belligerent from threatening NGOs, and can offer some protection to NGOs	Local military or security forces can neither deter belligerent from threatening NGOs, nor protect NGOs
Political constraints	There is significant and effective international and local pressure to prevent belligerent from threatening NGOs	There is occasional international and local pressure that somewhat limits the belligerent's freedom to threaten NGOs	There is no effective pressure limiting the belligerent from threatening NGOs
Total			

4. Look for indicators of changes to the threat environment

Threat indicators—events that suggest possible changes in the threat environment—are a useful tool for considering future threats.

- Using threat indicators takes little time beyond observation during your daily routines, and are the only means to consider future threats.
- It is extremely difficult, however, to use threat indicators appropriately because indicators (1) only *suggest* a potential change in the threat environment—not definitely predict one, and (2) may differ by country, culture, setting (rural or urban areas), and socio-economic class.

There are three approaches to threat indicators. For each, the presence of any indicator should trigger a closer examination of the situation to determine whether a change is likely.

- *Situational awareness.* Maintain situational awareness by continuously looking for any recent changes that may affect the threats you face. This is primarily a matter of vigilance (constantly looking for changes) and discipline (remembering to ask yourself whether anything has changed, either at the end of every day or week).
- *Near- to mid-term changes.* Look for indicators of changes in the situation that may point to a potential change in near- to mid-term threats for each of the three causes of threats. Potential indicators of such changes are in the table below.
- *Warning of imminent confrontation.* In most places, the local populace and security forces (military and police) will have more warning of impending confrontations (military battles, riots) than foreign NGOs. You can use their visible preparations for confrontations as potential indicators of an imminent confrontation. Some of the potential indicators are in the table below.

Indicators of Changes in the Threat Environment

Area _____

Date _____

Indicators of Near- to Mid-Term Changes Indicators

Threats of crime and banditry	Demobilization of soldiers Worsening unemployment and economic conditions (inflation decreasing “real” income) Budget constraints resulting in lower pay to soldiers or police New splits within military/rebel command structures (which can lead to less control over soldiers)
Direct threats (being targeted)	Any event that increases a belligerent’s need for resources (e.g., budget constraints, a new offensive) Change in rebel alliances
Indirect threats (caught in the crossfire)	Increased use of indiscriminate weapons and tactics (e.g., artillery) New military offensives for which there are no clear battle lines

Indicators of Imminent Conflict Indicators

Security force preparations	Work/repair of military positions Military convoys on the road Stockpiling of food, supplies Increased recruiting Public blood collection drives Unit rotations (better-equipped units arriving) Departure of soldiers’ families New checkpoints Checkpoints start to be manned by soldiers instead of police Laying mines near military positions Dumping of road-building supplies (e.g., gravel) near a border Designation of restricted areas (especially near borders)
Local preparations	Departures from area of families Gathering important possessions Hoarding of food, supplies Staff staying home with families Staff asking for NGO protection Children staying close to home/parents Low participation in camp activities Markets closed/limited People not going out at night People staying off the road

Worksheets, tips and tools

This section provides supplementary tips and tools to conduct threat assessment.

Assessing accuracy of information

Most of the information you require for threat assessments will not be based on your personal, first-hand experience. Therefore, you must (either implicitly or explicitly) evaluate the accuracy of the information given to you. The simplest way to do so is to ask two questions about the person providing it:

- Does he have direct knowledge of it (saw the mines on the road himself) or indirect knowledge, having hears it through one or more other people?
- Has he provided you with information that has been reliable in the past?

In some cases, this approach will not lead to meaningful conclusions because you don't know the answers to the questions. In such instances, you can use the *Information Accuracy Checklist* below to ask other questions that may indicate whether the information is accurate.

Information Accuracy Checklist			
Questions	Yes	Somewhat	No
Two key questions about person providing the information			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Does he/she have direct access to the information? ▪ Has information he has reported in the past been reliable? 			
Questions on the information			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ It makes sense given what you know about the broader situation ▪ You have information consistent with it ▪ You have <i>no</i> information that contradicts it 			
Questions on the person providing the information			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Probably believes you could verify the information ▪ Relies upon you for employment ▪ Will <i>not</i> benefit from your reaction to the information ▪ Expects to have a continuing relationship with you ▪ You have known him/her for some time 			

Threat assessment Summary								
Locations	Daily Routine	Types of Threats		Threat Level			Changes in Threats	
		Vehicle Travel/Transport	Sites	Crime	Belligerents	Indirect	Imminent	Near- to Mid-term
Fill out lines for each location that has different types of threats, threat levels, or potential changes in threats	Place threats you may face in each of three categories. Threats may include: Pickpockets/bag snatchers, car-jacking, checkpoints/roadblocks, landmines, pilferage, theft, bomb threats, arson, hold-up/robbery, demonstrations/riots, detention, kidnapping, artillery/bombing, assault/sniper fire, and kidnapping.			High/Medium/Low (H/M/L) for each of the three causes based on the underlying factors affecting threat levels in the threat level tables			Yes/No based on presence of threat indicators	

Conflict mapping

Conflict mapping is a method of identifying the geographic locations of certain military aspects of a conflict to identify locations where you may be at risk.

- The advantages of conflict mapping are that it helps you in identifying locations in which you may be at risk, and requires little more information than you probably already possess.
- The main disadvantage is that it is only useful if you are in a situation in which there is a military conflict, and it provides little insight into the types of threats you might face.

To map a conflict, start with the conflict mapping checklist and an uncluttered map of the area.

- Mark the main locations of the conflict. If you are unsure if an area is under government control or actively disputed by a belligerent, place conflict-related incidents on the map to provide insight (e.g., raids of villages and camps, military-rebel clashes, ambushes, timed landmine detonations, assassinations).
- Mark your NGO locations.
- Mark potential areas in which your NGO is mostly likely to face *indirect* threats,. Then compare them with your NGO locations.
- Identify areas in which your NGO may face *direct* threats (areas controlled by belligerents that have targeted your NGO in the past, or those that you believe will do so in the future).

Conflict Mapping Checklist	
Conflict locations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Areas under control of each belligerent ▪ Disputed areas: Zones over which belligerents fight, but are not clearly controlled by one group ▪ Areas that are mined
Potential areas of indirect threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Areas at which the areas under control of belligerents meet ▪ Disputed areas ▪ Areas that are mined
NGO locations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NGO sites ▪ Residences ▪ Offices ▪ Warehouses ▪ Service distribution points ▪ Sites NGOs often visit ▪ Ports ▪ Airfields ▪ UN/government offices ▪ Roads on which NGOs travel or transport aid

The last of the three threat level worksheets (threat of being targeted by belligerents) asks you to consider what motivations belligerents might have in targeting you.

The table below presents a list of fifteen potential motivations for belligerents targeting NGOs (grouped in four general categories which correspond to four common objectives of belligerents in conflicts).

Motivation for Targeting
<p>Obtain military equipment and supplies</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Obtain funds to purchase military equipment and supplies (weapons, ammunition, vehicles, fuel, radios, food) 2. Obtain equipment/supplies that can be sold or bartered (four-wheel drive vehicles, radios, medicine, valuable foodstuffs) 3. Obtain <i>militarily</i> valuable equipment/supplies (four-wheel drive vehicles, radios, fuel)
<p>Obtain food</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Divert food aid to provide it to their military forces and the population supporting them 5. Prevent NGO attempts to reduce aid diversion efforts (refugee camp census, audits, or monitoring to uncover diversion) 6. Force NGOs to provide aid to populations in areas belligerents control for five reasons: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Belligerents may divert the aid to support military forces once the aid enters areas they control ▪ Belligerents may steal aid from the population or compel it to provide a portion of it ▪ The population may give some of the aid to the belligerents willingly ▪ The aid may relieve pressure on the belligerent's administration (especially a government) to provide for the population ▪ The aid may allow belligerents to spend more resources buying military equipment and supplies
<p>Support military strategy</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Prevent NGOs from providing aid to an area held by <i>another belligerent</i> because that might help the belligerent (for the same reasons above in number 6) 8. Prevent aid from reaching a besieged town (if the aid may relieve pressure on the group holding it) 9. Prevent aid from reaching an area if the aid is perceived as part of a strategy by another belligerent (usually a government) to win the "hearts and minds" of the local population 10. Prevent aid to specific government-controlled areas (regroupment, camps, hamlets) when such areas are part of a government strategy to depopulate the country side (making it into a "free-fire zone," and denying rebels support, recruits, and cover of local villages)
<p>Support political strategy</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. Increase the intensity of a conflict by provoking the government into over-reacting to an attack 12. Gain political recognition by forcing a government (or foreign donors) to negotiate with and recognize a rebel groups 13. Prevent NGOs from reporting human rights abuses 14. Gain political advantage by demonstrating that the government does not have control over an area, thereby undermining confidence in the government 15. Divert aid going to displaced persons/refugees if such aid will help make the displaced persons permanent residents

Glossary

Conflict mapping: Plotting certain military aspects of a conflict on a map to identify locations where you may face threats.

Image: Perception of the local population, authorities, and belligerents toward the agency's staff and programs

Pattern analysis: Identification of the most common features of threats (times, types, situation, location, and prevalence of incidents).

Threat: Possibility that someone will harm NGO personnel, or steal or damage NGO property—through purposeful, often-violent action.

Threat assessment: Analysis of the likelihood of confronting threats.

Threat indicators: Events that suggest a possible future change in the threat environment of an area.

Threat level—the likelihood that NGOs will encounter security incidents (usually described as high, medium or low).

Trend analysis: Identification of how threats are changing (e.g., is one type of incident becoming more prevalent than others).

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