International Medical Corps is actively recruiting for a Security Coordinator to support its activities in Afghanistan.

ESSENTIAL JOB DUTIES/SCOPE OF WORK:
1. The Security Coordinator will be responsible for security management as an advisor to the country director and will respond to emergency and crises situations where and when needed
2. Coordinate and provide training to field staff (Expatriates & Nationals)
3. Act as a liaison with local and regional officials, UN, NGO and other agencies regarding security issues in the planning, coordination, promotion of, and support for existing and future IMC projects
4. Collect, author, compile and analyze security related reports, SOP’s and humanitarian related security information from multiple sources ensuring IMC’s security posture is current and relevant to the situation on the ground
5. Track and report on relevant incidences, near misses, and the geopolitical situation in Afghanistan
6.Design and implement physical and operational security plans, make assessments and work within budget to implement safeguards for the protection of staff, assets and benificiaries
6. Support and build the capacity of national security staff
7. Work with HQ security to insure the proper implementation of security policies and procedures


QUALIFICATIONS:
1. 5 years of field security experience in hostile environments
2. 1 to 3 years in Afghanistan
3. Advance First Aid training
4. Previous experience working in NGO
5. Ability to exercise sound judgment and make decisions independently
6. Extremely flexible with the ability to cope with stressful situations and frustrations
7. Ability to relate to and motivate local and international staff effectively and diplomatically
8. Creativity and the ability to work with limited resources
9. Excellent decision making skills
10. Must be able to work independently under difficult conditions

You’ll need to visit the IMC jobs site to apply.

Tags: Afghanistan, Jobs

Correction: Trevor Hughes, the Director of Global Security for IMC, wrote to let me know “the worldwide position is an anticipated position that we are collecting resumes for but not yet actively recruiting for”. He also kindly pointed out that they are actively recruiting for an NGO security officer for Afghanistan. Sorry for any confusion I may have caused.

International Medical Corps anticipates that it will have a position for a global NGO security co-ordinator. Get your application in early.

Summary:
The primary function of the Security Co-ordinator is to manage Security Officers in different parts of the country, monitor and assess security conditions, and make recommendations to the Country Director to provide overall security coverage for IMC expatriate and national staff.

Responsibilities:
• Develop and update an emergency security and evacuation plan.
• Supervise and train national counterpart and security officers in the region.
• Co-ordinate and monitor security activities to ensure that safety policies and procedures are implemented.
• Ensure that all field staff are fully cognizant of prevailing security threats and fully advised on means to reduce staff vulnerability to those threats.
• Liaise with UN agencies, CF forces, and other INGO’s on the security in the country.
• Design and drill warden systems, emergency radio networks, and provisioning of emergency supplies for field personnel.

Qualifications:
• Five years of work experience in Security Management in an emergency setting.
• Must have experience in unstable and resource deprived environments.
• Strong understanding of cultural, political and religious environment in the region, and be able to live and work successfully in those environments.
• Experience in the management of disaster relief personnel in hazard areas.
• Practical experience and knowledge of threat assessment and personal Security Management.

Language Skills:
Fluent English

Work Environment:
While performing duties of the job, the employee frequently works in precarious places. The employee is usually employed in areas of civil strife, which often result in an unstable security environment. Occasionally work in outdoor weather conditions.

You’ll need to visit the IMC jobs site to apply.

Tags: Jobs, Global

International Medical Corps has a vacancy for an NGO security officer based in Goma, DRC.

ESSENTIAL JOB DUTIES/SCOPE OF WORK:
1. The Security Officer will be responsible for security management as an advisor to the Country Director and will respond to emergency and crises situations where and when needed
2. Co-ordinate and provide training to field staff (Expatriates & Nationals)
3. Act as a liaison with local and regional officials, UN, NGO and other agencies regarding security issues in the planning, co-ordination, promotion of, and support for existing and future IMC projects
4. Collect, author, compile and analyze security related reports, SOP’s and humanitarian related security information from multiple sources ensuring IMC’s security posture is current and relevant to the situation on the ground
5. Track and report on relevant incidences, near misses, and the geopolitical situation in DRC and relevant bordering countries
6. Support and build the capacity of national security staff
7. Work with HQ security to insure the proper implementation of security policies and procedures
8. Support CD as required


QUALIFICATIONS:
1. Fluent in French and English- required
2. 5 years of field security experience in hostile environments
3. 1 to 3 years in DRC
4. Advance First Aid training
5. Previous experience working in NGO
6. Ability to exercise sound judgement and make decisions independently
7. Extremely flexible with the ability to cope with stressful situations and frustrations
8. Ability to relate to and motivate local staff effectively
9. Creativity and the ability to work with limited resources
10. Excellent decision making skills
11. Must work independently under difficult conditions

You’ll need to visit the IMC jobs site to apply.

Tags: DRC, Jobs

On 21 February 2009, two Sudanese members of Aide Médicale Internationale (AMI) were killed by camel riding gunmen near Nyala, in Darfur, Sudan.

A dozen gunmen had forced a cargo truck and the passenger bus on which the AMI staff were riding to stop at the roadside in an apparent act of banditry. The gunmen then opened fire killing the two AMI staff members and wounding four other bus passengers. A third member of the AMI escaped unharmed.

The victims included a nurse practitioner and a health educator.

AMI has taken the decision to suspend programming the area to honour the memory of their slain colleagues.

Tags: Death of aid worker, Sudan

Better be despised for too anxious apprehensions, than ruined by too confident security. — Edmund Burke

Sandra van den Brink, an aid worker with Ayudamos, was among 12 bus passengers robbed and molested near Huehuetenango, Guatemala, on 19 February.

Sandra was on a small shuttle bus returning from a project visit in Mexico when four gunmen in a truck pulled alongside the bus and forced them to stop. The gunmen took control of the bus and drove it to a remote ravine where they tied and robbed the passengers. The gunmen sexually assaulted several of the female passengers during the incident.

There are a couple of things worth noting from this story. First is that Sandra obviously had some understanding of the context she was in and understood that the incident did not fit the normal crime pattern in the area. Unfortunately she was unable to act on the knowledge she had.

Second is that Sandra was instinctually afraid of being moved to what is known as the second crime scene. This isolated location is a place where the attackers feel more comfortable and in control. Common thieves rarely move their victims to a second location but rapists and murderers usually do. Being moved to a second crime scene drastically reduces a victim’s chances of survival.

Tags: Incident, Guatemala

Now that we have talked about acceptance as part of an NGO security strategy, highlighted a preference for an active approach to acceptance, and noted some contributing factors, it is time for a little quiz.

Simply answer the ten short questions below to see just how well your organization really does at pursuing acceptance. Be honest.

1. Does your organization have an acceptance plan?
a. A what? No, I don’t think so.
b. Yes
c. We don’t need an acceptance plan. We just build houses.

2. Is it written down?
a. No
b. Yes
c. We need a written acceptance plan?

3. Have you read it?
a. No
b. Yes
c. Yes, but it is thirty pages of buzzwords and humanitarian fluff and I still don’t know what my part in all this is.

4. Does your organization have a clear procedure allowing beneficiaries, community members, and staff to raise concerns and complaints at the Country Director level?
a. No
b. Yes
c. We don’t receive any complaints. Everyone loves our work.

5. How long does it take for the complaint originator to get a response?
a. More than a week
b. A week or less
c. We don’t bother responding. They’ll be happy enough once we finish building their new house.

6. Can the drivers, guards, receptionists and cleaners in your organization explain your organizations mandate in their own language?
a. No
b. Yes
c. They are just drivers and cleaners. They don’t need to know that stuff.

7. Do they believe it?
a. No
b. Yes
c. I have no idea.

8. Have all your staff read and understood the personal code of conduct?
a. We don’t have one
b. Yes
c. No

9. Does your organization enforce the personal code of conduct?
a. No
b. Yes
c. Codes of conduct are unrealistic. Corruption is the cost of doing business in countries like this.

10. How did your organization handle the last incident in which a staff member was threatened by beneficiaries, community members, armed groups, or local authorities?
a. We ignored it. It was probably just a one-time thing.
b. We have a good relationship with local power brokers. We’ve discussed the issue with them and they’ve promised to help.
c. Local community leaders don’t live long enough for us to develop a relationship with them and/or nobody dares to be seen talking to us.


Scoring

For every b. answer give yourself one point. For every c. answer take one point off. An answer of a. scores zero.

10 out of 10 — you probably have a good active acceptance plan. If your organization has an acceptance only security strategy this is the passing mark.

6 to 9 — not too bad. If your organization’s security approach is a mix of acceptance, protection, and deterrence strategies this is a pass.

1 to 5 — your organization has been assuming its acceptance. A lot of work needs to be done.

0 or less — are you sure you are working for a humanitarian organization and not the Marine Corps?

Note: If your organization is an INGO that has an acceptance only security strategy and you are working in Afghanistan, Somalia or Iraq it is an automatic FAIL. You should be looking for a new employer.

Tags: Acceptance

On 19 February 2009 gunmen attacked a Somali aid worker in Afgoye near Mogadishu, killing one security guard.

The armed men attacked the home of Mohamed Hassan Orow, the head of a local NGO, sparking a fire-fight with his private security guards.

Two bystanders were reportedly injured in the incident.

Employees of humanitarian organizations are regularly the target of attacks in Somalia. Most NGO’s have resorted to using private security guards.

Tags: Incident, Somalia

UN on alert ahead of Beshir arrest warrant decision - Unfortunate quote, “UNAMID spokesman Noureddine Mezni was unapologetic about the contingency planning.” Hmmm... need we ever be apologetic about contingency planning?

Italian nuns freed after kidnap by Somalis - Some good news for a change.

Security forces raid office, intimidate staff of NGO that reports on human rights abuses - Thai military forces NGO staff to reveal confidential information on victims of human rights abuses.

Sri Lanka to probe NGO activities - Having been directly involved in a previous Sri Lankan government inquiry into NGO activities I think the term ‘witch hunt’ is entirely appropriate.

Tags: Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, News, Thailand, kidnapping

Even active acceptance strategies have their limits as NGO security tools. As a wise friend pointed out acceptance doesn’t work very well with itinerant armed groups. Criminals, and others who make their living by preying on the weak, just don’t care that much about the good work your organization may be doing or how much the local population might like you. You’ll need something aside from an acceptance strategy to reduce the risk from these groups.

Acceptance strategies also have obvious limitations when it comes to dealing with groups and individuals who are fundamentally opposed to the values they perceive your group represents. Whether they object to your organization’s religious values, work with women, or status as ‘foreign meddlers’ it is going to be very difficult to change their perceptions even with two or three years of a consistently applied active acceptance plan.

Other factors that inhibit acceptance:

• rapid staff turnover (or rapid expansion after a disaster as in the Tsunami response or the Pakistan earthquake)

• recipient only programs that do not engage the wider community

• friction between national and international staff

• divisions between national staff along conflict lines or ethnicity

• failure to deliver on promises or perceived promises to communities


Factors that promote acceptance:

• a long term presence in the project area (but only if you have been pursuing acceptance during that period)

• knowledge of local customs and language

• A close relationship/understanding between national and international staff

Tags: Acceptance, NGO Security

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) is reporting that a national staff member of an INGO has been assassinated in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The staff member was apparently shot several times in the head. Night letters, anonymous fliers distributed at night, had recently been posted in the area threatening anyone working for foreign organizations.

Although ANSO indicates that details are sketchy and caution that details may change they quite rightly point out that NGO’s should take the information at face value until further information becomes available.

Tags: Incident, Death of aid worker, Afghanistan

UNDP has a vacancy for a security guard force manager in Hargeisa, Somalia.


More details.

Tags: Jobs, Somalia

NRC seeks a regional NGO security advisor for Afghanistan and Pakistan.



More details

Tags: Jobs, Afghanistan, Pakistan

According to the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) two members of its field staff were abducted on 2 February in Vavuniya, Sri Lanka. The pair were on leave at the time. On 10 February their bodies were found near the government controlled town.

There is something about this incident that reeks of pathos. Murdered in a dirty little war... no press coverage... reduced to an anonymous three paragraph press statement.

If anyone knows their names please send them my way and I’ll record them here.

FSD press statement.

Tags: Incident, Death of aid worker, Sri Lanka

Sri Lankan newspapers are reporting the death of two foreign aid workers after they accidently drove their vehicle off the end of the Muttur to Trincomalee ferry in eastern Sri Lanka.

Local police have stated that the pair started their vehicle to run the air conditioning without realizing that the vehicle had been left in gear. The bodies of the yet unnamed aid workers have been recovered and are in the Trincomalee hospital.

Tags: Death of aid worker, Accident, Sri Lanka

Last week we looked at the acceptance fallacies that sometimes prevent NGO’s from properly implementing an acceptance strategy as part of an overall NGO security plan. Today we’ll look at a more robust approach to pursuing acceptance for humanitarian actors and activity.

Real acceptance is ‘active acceptance’. It needs to be continuously pursued and won. In order for an NGO to develop an active acceptance strategy an acceptance plan needs to be written, resources allocated to it, and deliberate action taken. Active acceptance involves regularly communicating with governmental groups, non-state actors, armed factions, and other key parties. The communication can be direct or through intermediaries when discretion is required. The communication needs to be two way.

All NGO staff need to be involved in the acceptance effort. Whether they are program managers, humanitarian field staff, or drivers, they need to be able to clearly communicate the humanitarian mandate of their organization. They also need to act in a manner compatible with the mandate. One misbehaving staff member can quickly destroy an organizations acceptance.

Other considerations:

• Active acceptance is costly in terms of time and resources but is cheap compared to the consequences of poor acceptance.

• Acceptance can be difficult to achieve in fluid conflict environments. New factions require new negotiations and agreements need constant reinforcement.

• Negotiations, especially with armed factions can be particularly stressful for staff.

• A rapid expansion in the number of NGOs in a country during a humanitarian emergency can make it difficult for any organization to maintain an independent identity. The actions of NGO’s with no pre-crisis experience in the affected area can have a negative effect on the acceptance of more experienced organizations.

• Your organization doesn’t exist in a vacuum. The actions of other aid organizations effect the perceptions of yours. Joint acceptance strategies should be considered.

Tags: NGO Security, Acceptance

There are all kinds of devices invented for the protection and preservation of countries: defensive barriers, forts, trenches, and the like... But prudent minds have as a natural gift one safeguard which is the common possession of all, and this applies especially to the dealings of democracies. What is this safeguard? Skepticism. This you must preserve. This you must retain. If you can keep this, you need fear no harm. — Demosthenes

Vehicles burned by an angry mob — at least partially due to the ‘good program’ fallacy.

In the traditional version of the acceptance approach to security an aid organization seeks to cultivate an atmosphere of trust and familiarity with beneficiaries and the host community. The idea is that beneficiaries and host community members will not target their ‘friends’ and will provide warning of impending attack by criminals or outsiders.

It’s a good approach that fits well with humanitarian ideals. Unfortunately many aid agencies fall victim to one or more of three acceptance ‘fallacies’ that prevent proper implementation of a real acceptance strategy. The first two have been outlined in “Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations”, by Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Katherine Haver.

Passive or assumed acceptance fallacy: To put is bluntly this fallacy is the end result of faulty logic. The assumption is made that if the organization does not have protective and deterrent measures it must therefore have an acceptance based strategy.

The exceptionalist fallacy: The assumption that an organization can simply reiterate humanitarian principles and proclaim its neutrality and independence from all belligerent parties. The problem with this approach is that beneficiaries don’t read organizational policy documents and they often have learned to be suspicious of the moral proclamations of outsiders and those in positions of authority.

The good program fallacy: I sometimes refer to this as the ‘good houses’ fallacy. It is easy to assume that merely building ‘good houses’, or implementing good programming is all that is required to gain acceptance.

So how do we gain real acceptance? Stick around. We’ll discuss that in a future post.

Tags: NGO Security, Acceptance

Five Sudanese charged with murdering U.S. aid worker - In an area where impunity is the order of the day it looks like just might actually be done in the case of the murder of John Granville. Minor point - I think this should read “USAID worker” versus “U.S. aid worker”.

Israel seizes Gaza-bound aid ship - If you are trying to get aid into Gaza its probably not prudent to contract a Lebanese vessel.

Lone worker solution - I wouldn’t actually advocate sending aid workers out alone but this might be good for small teams in high risk environments.

Tags: links, Tools, News

I’ve noticed that many readers of this blog are new to NGO security. Some are military or police personnel looking to move over to NGO security. Others are aid workers looking to expand their security knowledge. Either way I think that it might be time to review some NGO security basics. I would ask that more experienced readers be patient. Don’t worry, we’ll work our way up to some new ideas shortly.

Let’s start with the classic NGO ‘Security Triangle’. Most NGO’s use this model of risk reduction methodology. Essentially the model proposes that there are three primary means of reducing risk faced by NGO’s and their staff; acceptance, protection and deterrence. This diagram from a Tear Fund security manual sums it up nicely.


Image from Tear Fund’s “Safety in Travel Guide”, April 2006.

Most NGO’s emphasize acceptance, and to some extent protection, over deterrence.

We’ll look at what these terms mean over the next few days. They are not as simple as they might seem at first glance and many people overlook their deeper ramifications.

Teaser: Personally I think it should be the NGO ‘Security Square’.

Tags: NGO Security

According to MSF two of their medical staff were killed during fighting in Swat district, Pakistan on Sunday 1 February 2009. The two staff were on their way to collect casualties of the heavy fighting when their clearly marked ambulances were fired upon in Charbagh.

Riaz Ahmad (24) and Nasar Ali (27) were killed in the attack. An MSF volunteer was also injured in the attack. The drivers of both ambulances escaped injury.

Attacks on independent medical staff strike me as extremely myopic. You might deprive your enemy of medical care but you also deprive yourself, your colleagues, and your community of the same care.

For more on attacks on aid workers in 2009 check out the aid worker fatalities map.

Tags: Death of aid worker, Incident, Pakistan

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) is currently seeking Security Professionals to replenish its pool of qualified candidates. To add yourself to their database follow this link and submit your resume. You only have until 28 February so don’t delay.

Tags: Jobs, Global

On 2 February, unidentified gunmen kidnapped UNHCR sub-office Chief John Soloki from the Chaman Housing area in Quetta, Pakistan. The gunmen opened fire on his vehicle as he was leaving for work in the morning killing his driver.

Tags: Death of aid worker, Pakistan, Incident

Aid workers consult with community members in Pakistan

Tracking fatal attacks on aid workers has left me wondering who qualifies for the label of ‘humanitarian aid worker’. It seemed simple enough at first glance. Staff with organizations like OXFAM, Save the Children, World Vision, Mercy Corps and others are obvious choices. The same applies for the staff of numerous nationally based counterpart organizations.

I also include civilian UN staff on the list. I don’t include UN Peacekeepers. Its not that I’m not sympathetic to the challenges they face. I was a Peacekeeper myself for a brief while. Its just that their status and mandate differs from that of an aid worker.

Where the problem comes in is drawing the line between aid workers and what might be called ‘contracted support’. Are the drivers of companies contracted to deliver food for WFP ‘aid workers’? Does and attack on a convoy of WFP contracted vehicles equate to an attack on humanitarian aid workers? How about if the vehicles all clearly marked with the WFP logo?

If USAID contracts an advisor through a company like BearingPoint does that person become an aid worker? How about a gardener with a small aid organization? Security guards?